Corporate Governance and Competition Policy

55 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2010 Last revised: 25 Mar 2012

Spencer Weber Waller

Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies

Abstract

Corporate governance law addresses the misaligned incentives between officers and directors of publicly-owned companies and their shareholders and how this can lead to the destruction of shareholder value. Antitrust law governs the interaction between corporations and other economic actors in the marketplace and prohibits and penalizes anticompetitive agreements, unilateral conduct which unreasonably injures competition, and mergers and acquisitions which may substantially lessen competition.

This article explores the puzzling lack of meaningful interaction between these two fields of law which govern the internal and external operations of key economic players in our economy. While a handful of commentators have lamented the lack of a closer organic connection between these two bodies of law, most do not even notice. This article goes beyond the conventional disconnect and discusses how to create a more unified approach to two key area of business law in order to promote the interests of both shareholders and consumers in a more systematic and meaningful way.

Keywords: corporate governance, agency costs, business judgment rule, board of directors, antitrust, competition policy, cartels, corporate compliance, rule of reason, mergers, acquisitions, value destroying, monopolization, interlocking directorates

JEL Classification: D21, G34, G30, G38, K21, L40, L41, M14

Suggested Citation

Waller, Spencer Weber, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy. George Mason Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1681673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1681673

Spencer Weber Waller (Contact Author)

Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law - Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies ( email )

25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-915-7137 (Phone)
312-915-7201 (Fax)

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