Toward an Asymmetric Coase Theorem

16 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2010

See all articles by Barbara Luppi

Barbara Luppi

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna; University of Miami, School of Law

Date Written: September 28, 2010

Abstract

Various reformulations of the Coase theorem have developed normative corollaries on the choice of optimal remedies in the presence of positive transaction costs. In this article, we consider the extent to which these propositions are affected by the presence of asymmetric transaction costs, and we offer a reformulation of the Coase theorem which takes into account asymmetrical transaction costs. Our analysis combines several insights from the existing literature on property-type versus liability-type remedies, identifying the conditions for the superiority of each type of remedy. Further, we consider the possible use of mixed remedies and identify the optimal scope of such solution.

Keywords: Coase Theorem, Property-Type Remedies, Liability-Type Remedies

JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70

Suggested Citation

Luppi, Barbara and Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Toward an Asymmetric Coase Theorem (September 28, 2010). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-55, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1684062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1684062

Barbara Luppi

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Viale Berengario 51
41100 Modena, Modena 41100
Italy

University of St. Thomas School of Law

2115 Summit Avenue
Saint Paul, MN 55105
United States

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

University of Miami, School of Law ( email )

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