Democracy and Transparency

27 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2010

See all articles by James R. Hollyer

James R. Hollyer

Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota

B. Peter Rosendorff

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 29, 2010

Abstract

Are democracies more transparent than other types of political regimes? The answer to this question is often assumed to be yes. The contestability of elections and transparency of policy-making are however, analytically distinct concepts. We investigate theoretically the willingness of policy-makers to provide credible announcements of policy-relevant variables, and show that the availability (or absence) of that data is correlated with regime type, even after controlling for level of development, participation in IMF programs, country-specific effects, and the effects of time. Democracies are indeed more transparent.

Keywords: Transparency, Democracy, Elections

Suggested Citation

Hollyer, James R. and Rosendorff, Bryan Peter and Vreeland, James Raymond, Democracy and Transparency (September 29, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1684813 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1684813

James R. Hollyer (Contact Author)

Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota ( email )

1414 Social Sciences
267 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jameshollyer.com

Bryan Peter Rosendorff

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

19 West 4th St.
2nd Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com

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