Electoral Cycles Through Lobbying

25 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2010

See all articles by Marco Bonomo

Marco Bonomo

Insper Institute of Education and Research

Cristina Terra

ESSEC Business School; University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA

Abstract

In this paper, we build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our setup to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures, and real exchange rates.

Suggested Citation

Bonomo, Marco and Terra, Cristina, Electoral Cycles Through Lobbying. Economics & Politics, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 446-470, November 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1684886 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00371.x

Marco Bonomo (Contact Author)

Insper Institute of Education and Research ( email )

R Quata 300
Sao Paulo, 04542-030
Brazil

Cristina Terra

ESSEC Business School ( email )

95021 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
France

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA ( email )

33 boulevard du port
F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 95011
France

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