42 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2010
Date Written: July 27, 2010
If control of their firms allows entrepreneurs to derive private benefits, it also allows other controlling parties. Private benefits are especially relevant for venture capitalists, who typically get considerable control in their portfolio firms, but not for banks, which are passive loan providers. We incorporate this difference between banks and venture capital and analyze entrepreneurs' financing strategy between the two. We find that, in all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private benefits more choose banks while the rest choose venture capital. Thus, bank-financed entrepreneurs allocate more resources to tasks that yield private benefits while VC-backed entrepreneurs have higher profitability.
Keywords: bank, control, entrepreneurship, private benefit, venture capital
JEL Classification: G21, G24, G32, L26, M13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Barlo, Mehmet and Inci, Eren, Banks Versus Venture Capital When the Venture Capitalist Values Private Benefits of Control (July 27, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1685173 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1685173