The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System

Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 155

36 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 1999

See all articles by Daniel P. Kessler

Daniel P. Kessler

Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Anne Morrison Piehl

Rutgers University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 1998

Abstract

Although a substantial body of research suggests that the discretion of actors in the criminal justice system is important, there is disagreement in the existing empirical literature over the specific role of discretion and over the extent to which discretion influences criminal justice outcomes. Studies in this literature generally hypothesize that discretion plays one of two roles: either it serves as the means by which changing broad social norms against crime cause changes in sentencing patterns (with concurrent changes in formal laws reflecting broad social norms but not causing criminal justice outcomes), or it serves as the means by which internal social norms of the criminal justice system prevent the implementation of formal changes in laws.

We reject both of these hypotheses using data on the sentencing of California prisoners before and after the passage of Proposition 8, which provided for sentence enhancements for those convicted of certain "serious" crimes with "qualifying" criminal histories. We find that an increase in the statutory sentence for a given crime can increase sentence length for those who are charged with the crime, and also for those who are charged with factually "similar" crimes, where a "similar" crime is defined as one that has legal elements in common with the given crime. These spillovers are consistent with neither broad social norms nor internal social norms, so we conclude that discretion takes a less-well studied form, which we call "prosecutorial maximization."

Suggested Citation

Kessler, Daniel Philip and Piehl, Anne Morrison, The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System (February 1998). Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 155. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=168611 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.168611

Daniel Philip Kessler (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Anne Morrison Piehl

Rutgers University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States
(732) 932-7363 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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