The Principle of Hiring the Best Available Academics

International Journal of Educational Management, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 523-532, 2009

Posted: 5 Oct 2010

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Purpose – Higher education, including research, depends crucially on the people involved, their talents and human capital. Therefore, a university can improve or at least maintain its standing by hiring only the best available academics. Hiring the absolute best may be too expensive for most and is impossible for all. However, it is not too difficult to recognise the relatively best scholars. The real problem is to act on this knowledge instead of following other objectives. That is why detached decision makers like managers, politicians or academics from other institutions may be in a better position than faculty members with respect to senior hirings. This paper aims to address these issues

Design/methodology/approach – The argument is explained in detail and historical examples are given.

Findings – It is shown why and how to hire the best available academics. The existence of many deviations from this rule offers opportunities for those who follow it.

Research limitations/implications – Besides some practical problems, the key intellectual problem is to measure or even define quality in academia. The principle holds nevertheless for any kind of academic quality.

Practical implications – Universities can improve their status by hiring the best available academics.

Originality/value – One simple (formal) principle can structure the recruiting process and thereby change universities for the better.

Keywords: Academic staff, Governance, Human capital, Leadership, Quality, Recruitment, Skills

JEL Classification: M51, I21, J23, J44, J45, H52

Suggested Citation

Dilger, Alexander, The Principle of Hiring the Best Available Academics (2009). International Journal of Educational Management, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 523-532, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1686802

Alexander Dilger (Contact Author)

University of Münster ( email )

Institute for Organisational Economics
Scharnhorststr. 100
Münster, D-48151
Germany
+49-251-83-25330 (Phone)
+49-251-83-28429 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/io/en/organisation/Dilger.html

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
367
PlumX Metrics