Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications
33 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2010 Last revised: 14 Jun 2012
Date Written: August 30, 2010
Abstract
This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, I derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or I show that it does not exist. Each participant's utility is quasi-linear in money, and depend upon the allocation that he gets - thus, a participant's privately known 'type' is multidimensional. The key properties are incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties.
Keywords: Auctions, Ex Post Incentive Compatibility, Incomplete Information, Matching, Multidimensional Types
JEL Classification: C71, C78, D82, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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