Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations

Posted: 5 Oct 2010

See all articles by Lucas Ronconi

Lucas Ronconi

Centro de Investigación y Acción Social & CONICET

Date Written: July 1, 2010

Abstract

The author empirically analyzes the effect of government enforcement on compliance with labor regulations in Argentina, a country where only half of the workforce receives all the benefits to which they are legally entitled. Constructing a panel data set of the period 1995–2002 across provinces and using the number of labor inspectors per capita as a proxy for enforcement, he investigates the extent to which employers comply with six employment and social security regulations: minimum wage, maximum hours, paid vacation time, annual extra monthly wage, workers’ compensation insurance, and health insurance. Because of potential simultaneity between enforcement and compliance, the author explores whether the electoral cycle affects enforcement. Two-stage least squares estimates suggest enforcement increases compliance.

Keywords: Labor regulations, compliance, enforcement, informal labor, Latin America 

JEL Classification: J8, J3, H26, K32, K41, O17

Suggested Citation

Ronconi, Lucas, Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations (July 1, 2010). Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1687308

Lucas Ronconi (Contact Author)

Centro de Investigación y Acción Social & CONICET ( email )

Av. Callao 542
Buenos Aires, 1022
Argentina

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