Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees

27 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2010

See all articles by Alexander Kemnitz

Alexander Kemnitz

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management

Date Written: September 30, 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates how the abolishment of a ban on tuition fees affects the quality of higher education with centralized and decentralized decision making. It is shown that a marginal introduction of tuition fees fully crowds out public funds under centralization, whereas educational quality improves under decentralization. However, if the government has full discretion about the tuition fee level, centralization leads to the efficient quality, fully extracting the income gains from the graduates, while decentralization typically induces inefficiently low spending levels.

Keywords: higher education, federalism, tuition fees

JEL Classification: H77, I22, D78

Suggested Citation

Kemnitz, Alexander, Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees (September 30, 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3193. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1687578

Alexander Kemnitz (Contact Author)

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
626
Abstract Views
2,474
rank
41,447
PlumX Metrics