Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program

Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 698-716

Posted: 7 Oct 2010

See all articles by Andrew A. King

Andrew A. King

Questrom School of Business- Boston University

Michael Lenox

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

Industry self-regulation, the voluntary association of firms to control their collective action, has been proposed as a complement to government regulation. Proponents argue that the establishment of such structures may institutionalize environmental improvement, while critics suggest that without explicit sanctions such structures will fall victim to opportunistic behavior. In a study of the Chemical Manufacturer Association’s Responsible Care program we investigate the predictions of these two contradictory perspectives. Our findings highlight the potential for opportunism to overcome the isomorphic pressures of even powerful self-regulatory institutions and suggest that effective industry self-regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit sanctions.

Keywords: self-regulation, institutions, codes of conduct

Suggested Citation

King, Andrew A. and Lenox, Michael, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program (2000). Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 698-716, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1687958

Andrew A. King

Questrom School of Business- Boston University ( email )

Boston, MA 02215
United States

Michael Lenox (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/LenoxM/index.htm

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