Download This PaperOverlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks
46 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2010
Date Written: October 11, 2010
Abstract
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.
Keywords: Overlapping Coalitions, Cover Function, Bargaining, Symmetric Game, Network
JEL Classification: C71, C72, C78, D62, D85
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Agbaglah, Messan and Ehlers, Lars, Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (October 11, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 116.2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1690472 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1690472
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.