Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

46 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2010

See all articles by Messan Agbaglah

Messan Agbaglah

Université de Montréal

Lars Ehlers

University of Montreal - Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ

Date Written: October 11, 2010

Abstract

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.

Keywords: Overlapping Coalitions, Cover Function, Bargaining, Symmetric Game, Network

JEL Classification: C71, C72, C78, D62, D85

Suggested Citation

Agbaglah, Messan and Ehlers, Lars, Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (October 11, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 116.2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1690472 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1690472

Messan Agbaglah (Contact Author)

Université de Montréal ( email )

C.P. 6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Lars Ehlers

University of Montreal - Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ ( email )

C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
76
Abstract Views
997
Rank
561,582
PlumX Metrics