The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-102
25 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2010
Date Written: September 21, 2010
This paper analyses the political constraints of intergenerational risk sharing. The first result is that the political process generally does not lead to ex ante optimal insurance. The second result is that in a second best political setting PAYG still contributes to intergenerational risk sharing. The third result is that aging increases the discrepancy between first-best and second-best transfers. The source of the inefficiency is that politicians redistribute to larger and easier swayed cohorts. Ex post redistribution to lower incomes still leads to an outcome that from an ex ante point of view is preferable to a situation without intergenerational transfers.
Keywords: risk sharing, aging, political economy
JEL Classification: D72, E61, H21, H55
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation