Download This PaperA Technical Note on Lorenz Dominance in Cooperative Games
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-101
12 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2010
Date Written: September 24, 2010
Abstract
In this paper we provide some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance, which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the algorithm in Dutta and Ray (1989), when exists, and the elements of the equal split-off set always Lorenz dominate every allocation in the core of the game.
Keywords: Cooperative Games, Lorenz Dominance, Egalitarianism, Constrained Egalitarian Solution, Equal Split-Off Set
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Branzei, Rodica and Tijs, Stef H. and Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín and Llorca Pascual, Natividad, A Technical Note on Lorenz Dominance in Cooperative Games (September 24, 2010). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-101, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1690560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1690560
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