Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The Relationship between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil

COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, S. Rose-Ackerman, P. Lindseth eds., Edward Elgar, 2010

24 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2010

See all articles by Mariana Mota Prado

Mariana Mota Prado

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

Regulatory agencies around the world, like other transplanted institutions, might look very similar if one analyzes solely their institutional design. However, there are considerable differences in how they operate in practice. This article shows some of these differences in the Brazilian context. The institutional reforms that took place in Brazil in the mid-1990s created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) with institutional features that largely resemble the features of US IRAs. However, in contrast to the United States, Brazil has one of the strongest presidencies in the world. Due to the peculiarities of Presidential systems in Latin America in general and Brazil in particular, the theory of congressional dominance that is largely used in the US fails to capture the reality of Brazilian IRAs. This article proposes a theory of presidential dominance to describe that Brazilian reality, and discusses the normative consequences of this presidential control over IRAs from a constitutional perspective.

Keywords: legal transplants, congressional dominance, presidential dominance, independent regulatory agency, principle-agent theory, IRA

Suggested Citation

Prado, Mariana Mota, Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The Relationship between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil (2010). COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, S. Rose-Ackerman, P. Lindseth eds., Edward Elgar, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1690815

Mariana Mota Prado (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty/prado

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