Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments

Posted: 14 Oct 2010

See all articles by Kaare Strom

Kaare Strom

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Wolfgang C. Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Government

Daniel M. Smith

Harvard University - Department of Government

Date Written: June 2010

Abstract

Parliamentary democracy means that the political executive is accountable to the parliamentary majority. However, when both the parliamentary majority and the cabinet consist of two or more distinct political parties, it is often difficult for the parliamentary majority to monitor and control the executive. In this article, we focus on political delegation from parliamentarians to the executive branch under multiparty parliamentary government. We identify the most important mechanisms parliamentary parties employ to remedy the accountability problems that may arise, as well as the arenas in which they are exercised: the executive arena, the parliamentary arena, and the extraparliamentary arena. We discuss the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms arena by arena, examine their use in 15 Western European countries that frequently feature coalition governments, and review our knowledge of how parliaments and parliamentary parties control political delegation and accountability in coalition governments.

Suggested Citation

Strøm, Kaare and Müller, Wolfgang C. and Smith, Daniel M., Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments (June 2010). Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 13, pp. 517-535, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691303 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071105.104340

Kaare Strøm (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Wolfgang C. Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Government ( email )

1010 Wien
Hohenstaufengasse 9
Austria

Daniel M. Smith

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/danielmarkhamsmith

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