Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information
26 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2010 Last revised: 30 Sep 2011
Date Written: October 13, 2010
This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Keywords: cheap-talk, normal-form correlation, distributed computation
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Heller, Yuval and Solan, Eilon and Tomala, Tristan, Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information (October 13, 2010). Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691817
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