Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?

24 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2010

See all articles by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Mandar Oak

University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Date Written: October 13, 2010

Abstract

We analyze an agency model of political competition to examine whether conflict encourages hawkish behavior, and if such behavior can itself aggravate conflict. We consider situations of conflict between a state and an insurgent group, such as a conflict over a piece of land. Negotiations are carried on behalf of the state, by a democratically elected leader, whose ability and ideology are imperfectly observed by the electorate. A more capable leader can cede less land at a lower cost (modeled as the probability of the conflict continuing the next period) than a less capable one, while an ideologically hawkish leader enjoys a greater intrinsic utility from retaining land than a less hawkish leader. Two main results that emerge are: certain types of politicians may be excessively hawkish, (as compared to their first best policy choices), which itself increases the probability of conflict and for any credible voting strategy the probability of re-election for a hawk is greater than for a dove. Finally, we show that the voting equilibrium of this game does not always achieve a constrained Pareto optimum suggesting that third party mediation may improve welfare.

Keywords: conflict, hawkish drift

JEL Classification: C72, D82, P16

Suggested Citation

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha and Oak, Mandar, Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics? (October 13, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691843

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Mandar Oak

University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia

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