Pricing Damaged Goods

20 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2010

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

Companies with market power occasionally engage in intentional quality reduction of a portion of their output as a means of offering two qualities of goods for the purpose of price discrimination, even absent a cost saving. This paper provides an exact characterization in terms of marginal revenues of when such a strategy is profitable, which, remarkably, does not depend on the distribution of customer valuations, but only on the value of the damaged product relative to the undamaged product. In particular, when the damaged product provides a constant proportion of the value of the full product, selling a damaged good is unprofitable. One quality reduction produces higher profits than another if the former has higher marginal revenue than the latter.

JEL Classification: L15, D43

Suggested Citation

McAfee, Randolph Preston, Pricing Damaged Goods (2007). Economics Discussion Paper No. 2007-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691868 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691868

Randolph Preston McAfee (Contact Author)

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States

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