The Relational Advantages of Intermediation

36 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2010 Last revised: 18 Feb 2012

See all articles by Elena Belavina

Elena Belavina

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Karan Girotra

Cornell Tech; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Date Written: February 14, 2012


This paper provides a novel explanation for the use of supply chain intermediaries such as Li & Fung Ltd.. We find that even in the absence of the well-known transactional and informational advantages of mediation, intermediaries improve supply chain performance. In particular, intermediaries facilitate responsive adaptation of the buyers’ supplier base to their changing needs while simultaneously ensuring that suppliers behave as if they had long-term sourcing commitments from buying firms. In the face of changing buyer needs, an intermediary that sources on behalf of multiple buyers can responsively change the composition of future business committed to a supplier such that a sufficient level of business comes from the buyer(s) that most prefer this supplier. On the other hand, direct buyers that source only for themselves must provide all their committed business to a supplier from their own sourcing needs, even if they no longer prefer this supplier. Unlike existing theories of intermediation, our theory better explains the observed phenomenon that while transactional barriers and information asymmetries have steadily decreased, the use of intermediaries has soared, even among large companies such as Walmart.

Keywords: Global Sourcing, Intermediairies, Supply Chain Relationships, Relational Contracts, Flexibility, Li & Fung, Repeated Games

Suggested Citation

Belavina, Elena and Girotra, Karan, The Relational Advantages of Intermediation (February 14, 2012). INSEAD Working Paper No. 2012/19/TOM, Available at SSRN: or

Elena Belavina (Contact Author)

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

New York, NY 10044
United States


Karan Girotra

Cornell Tech ( email )

111 8th Avenue #302
New York, NY 10011
United States


Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States


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