The Economics of Private Voluntary Organizations and Collective Action in Deer Management

16 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 1997

See all articles by Karin Steffens

Karin Steffens

Northern Michigan University - Department of Economics

A. Allan Schmid

Michigan State University - Department of Agricultural Economics

Abstract

Game theory and other approaches have been used to characterize problems involving high-exclusion-cost goods which also have the characteristic that marginal cost of an additional user is zero over some range. These analytical tools have made valuable contributions to understanding voluntary organizations and collective action. Resource systems for which composition or scale of the resource is an important factor do not fit neatly into the types of problems which are typically analyzed. The Quality Deer Management Association (QDMA) in Southern Wisconsin is used as an example to illustrate where the existing literature must be modified to take account of particular features of this resource problem. Schelling's multi-person prisoner's dilemma model is modified to incorporate preferences and marginal benefits of deer quality to different types of hunters and to explore issues of resource sustainability. Against the odds, the private QDMA has successfully organized hunters to practice harvesting techniques consistent with improved herd quality.

JEL Classification: Q20, C71, D62

Suggested Citation

Steffens, Karin and Schmid, A. Allan, The Economics of Private Voluntary Organizations and Collective Action in Deer Management. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=16923 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.16923

Karin Steffens

Northern Michigan University - Department of Economics ( email )

162 Magers Hall
Marquette, MI 49855
United States
906-227-1217 (Phone)

A. Allan Schmid (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-2266 (Phone)
517-432-1800 (Fax)

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