Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada

28 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2010 Last revised: 26 Oct 2010

See all articles by David A. Jaeger

David A. Jaeger

Ph.D. Program in Economics, City University of New York Graduate Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Cologne - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Esteban F. Klor

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Sami H. Miaari

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences

Daniele Paserman

Boston University - Department of Economics; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: October 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates whether attacks against Israeli targets help Palestinian factions gain public support. We link individual level survey data to the full list of Israeli fatalities during the period of the Second Intifada (2000-2006), and estimate a flexible discrete choice model for faction supported. We find some support for the "outbidding" hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community. In particular, the two leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, gain in popularity following successful attacks against Israeli targets. Our results suggest, however, that most movement occurs within either the secular groups or the Islamist groups, and not between them. That is, Fatah's gains come at the expense of smaller secular factions while Hamas' gains come at the expense of smaller Islamic factions and the disaffected. In contrast, attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad lower support for that faction.

Suggested Citation

Jaeger, David A. and Klor, Esteban F. and Miaari, Sami H. and Paserman, Daniele, Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada (October 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w16475. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1692537

David A. Jaeger (Contact Author)

Ph.D. Program in Economics, City University of New York Graduate Center ( email )

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Esteban F. Klor

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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Sami H. Miaari

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

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Israel

Daniele Paserman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Israel

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