Persuasion: Empirical Evidence

Posted: 18 Oct 2010

See all articles by Stefano DellaVigna

Stefano DellaVigna

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Matthew Gentzkow

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2010

Abstract

We provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the effects as well as the drivers of persuasive communication. We consider persuasion directed at consumers, voters, donors, and investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does persuasion affect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture the response to persuasive communication? Third, what are persuaders' incentives, and what limits their ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the way persuasion affects equilibrium outcomes in economics and politics?

Suggested Citation

DellaVigna, Stefano and Gentzkow, Matthew Aaron, Persuasion: Empirical Evidence (May 2010). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 2, pp. 643-669, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1693016 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124309

Stefano DellaVigna (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Economics Department
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Matthew Aaron Gentzkow

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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