Performance Evaluation in Competitive REE Models
51 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2010 Last revised: 17 Mar 2012
Date Written: October 15, 2010
Our basic premise is that fund managers performance is related to superior information about an asset payoff. We investigate the relationship between managerial skills and trading behavior within a two-period rational expectation equilibrium (REE) model where agents trade on private information in the first round, while a public signal arrives at the second date that makes traders revise their beliefs and retrade. The public signal can be related to the asset payoff, or to variables not related to fundamentals (noise), or both. We characterize the unique partially revealing REE and explore the drivers of price dynamics and trading behavior. Our main prediction is that good managers are contrarian traders, while bad managers are momentum traders when public news arrive to the market. Furthermore, the change in holdings of each type of trader is monotonic on the traders' skills. Based on these predictions, we propose new performance evaluation measures that rely on the manager's change in holdings around the arrival of public news rather than his past performance. A byproduct of our analysis is the proposal of a new protocol for performance evaluation and Due Diligence (DD) procedures.
Keywords: REE, Performance Evaluation, Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, Talent, Informed Traders, Due Diligence
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation