Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining
Posted: 18 Oct 2010
There are 2 versions of this paper
Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining
Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, Vol. 1, pp. 35-59, June 14, 2005
Number of pages: 25
Posted: 23 Jun 2005
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Date Written: December 2005
Abstract
We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise because of exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F., Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining (December 2005). Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2005), Vol. 1, pp. 35-59, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1693347 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115856
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