Group Lending under Costly Group Formation

24 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2010

See all articles by Prabirendra Chatterjee

Prabirendra Chatterjee

Foster School of Business, University of Washington

Sudipta Sarangi

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Date Written: January 31, 2004

Abstract

The success of joint liability programs depends on nature and composition of borrowing groups. Group formation is a costly process and in our model these costs vary with the social identity of group partners. We show that risk heterogeneity in a borrowing group may arise due to the social identity of the agents. The presence of caste and gender bias may not resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by information asymmetry between the borrowers and the lender. We also find that with costly group formation and state verification,individual liability lending may be better than joint liability lending.Thus ignoring social identity and group formation costs can lead to the failure of a joint liability program. Finally,the paper also suggests that targeting different social groups requires the use of a menu of joint liability costs.

Keywords: Group lending, Risk heterogeneity, Formation Costs, Social identity

JEL Classification: D82, G20, N23, O12

Suggested Citation

Chatterjee, Prabirendra and Sarangi, Sudipta, Group Lending under Costly Group Formation (January 31, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694331 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694331

Prabirendra Chatterjee (Contact Author)

Foster School of Business, University of Washington ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

Sudipta Sarangi

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University ( email )

250 Drillfield Drive
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States

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