The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence

de Rassenfosse, Gaétan; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1694924

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The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence

Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming

28 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2010 Last revised: 29 Oct 2011

See all articles by Gaétan de Rassenfosse

Gaétan de Rassenfosse

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)

Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

Free University of Brussels - Solvay Business School; Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2, 2011

Abstract

This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre-grant) fees and renewal (or post-grant) fees, depending on the structural context and on policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of thirty patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age.

Keywords: application fees, patent system, price elasticity, intellectual property policy, renewal fees

JEL Classification: O30, O31, O38, O57

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

de Rassenfosse, Gaétan and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence (October 2, 2011). Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694924