Stakeholder Reaction to Emissions Trading in the United States, the European Union, and the Netherlands

Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 137, 2009

20 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2010

See all articles by Bryant Walker Smith

Bryant Walker Smith

University of South Carolina - School of Law; Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

As a contribution to the debate over market-based environmental regulation, this article examines the reaction of stakeholders to cap-and-trade programs proposed and/or implemented in the United States, the European Union, and the Netherlands for industrial emissions of certain pollutants. Those pollutants include nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulfur dioxide (SO2), mercury (Hg), and greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2). For the purpose of the article, stakeholders include environmental groups, regulators, and particularly industry.

The broad conclusion, to which the remainder of the article provides context, is straightforward: Industry dislikes regulation. It strongly dislikes redundancy. It loathes uncertainty. Even emitters that have profited through emissions trading seem to remain generally averse to uncertainty. The result is a bias for the status quo, except when that status quo becomes too unpredictable or otherwise burdensome, and a bias against overlapping regulatory regimes.

Keywords: cap-and-trade, emissions trading, command-and-control, environmental regulation, climate change, greenhouse gas, NOX, sulfur dioxide, mercury, carbon dioxide

Suggested Citation

Smith, Bryant Walker, Stakeholder Reaction to Emissions Trading in the United States, the European Union, and the Netherlands (2009). Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 137, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1695089

Bryant Walker Smith (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - School of Law ( email )

Main & Greene Streets
Columbia, SC 29208
United States

Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/bws

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