Privatization, Insider Control and Managerial Entrenchment in Russia

Posted: 20 Jul 1999

See all articles by Mike Wright

Mike Wright

Nottingham University Business School

Igor Filatotchev

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School

Michael Bleaney

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Abstract

This paper provides new survey evidence on managerial entrenchment and the role of outsiders in the post-privatization restructuring of Russian enterprises. The major findings are that managers are hostile towards outside ownership, and they effectively collude with other employees to preserve insider control. The paper also provides empirical evidence that the gradual accumulation of shares by managers is not based only on a profit motive, but is also driven by their efforts to preserve insider control. The issues raised have relevance to other transition economies where the privatization process has encouraged insider control, such as Ukraine and Belarus.

JEL Classification: D23, G30, P52

Suggested Citation

Wright, Mike and Filatotchev, Igor and Bleaney, Michael, Privatization, Insider Control and Managerial Entrenchment in Russia. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=169514

Mike Wright

Nottingham University Business School ( email )

Jubilee Campus
Wollaton Road
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom
+44 115 951 5257 (Phone)
+44 115 951 5204 (Fax)

Igor Filatotchev (Contact Author)

City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

Michael Bleaney

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom
+44 0 115 951 5265 (Phone)
+44 0 115 951 5141 (Fax)

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