Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t

32 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2010

See all articles by Bernd Hayo

Bernd Hayo

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 20, 2010

Abstract

We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950–2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presidential systems. Based on a fixed effects ordered logit panel data model estimated over the period 1951–2000 for 146 countries, we find that such changes in the constitution can be explained by characteristics of the political system, internal and external political conflicts, and political leaders, whereas economic and socio-demographic variables do not matter.

Keywords: Constitutional change, form of government, endogenous constitutions, separation of powers, relevance of leaders

JEL Classification: H11, K10, P48

Suggested Citation

Hayo, Bernd and Voigt, Stefan, Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t (October 20, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1695147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1695147

Bernd Hayo

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 24
Marburg, D-35032
Germany
++49(0)6421-28-23091 (Phone)
++49(0)6421-28-23193 (Fax)

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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