The Link between Corporate Governance and Corruption in New Zealand

New Zealand Universities Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 42, 2010

39 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2010 Last revised: 1 Nov 2010

See all articles by Susan Watson

Susan Watson

University of Auckland Faculty of Law

Rebecca Hirsch

University of Auckland - Department of Commercial Law

Date Written: October 21, 2010

Abstract

Corporate corruption, in contrast to public sector corruption, has recently attracted increasing attention – mostly due to corporate scandals occurring internationally over the last decade. As the financial and social impact of corporate corruption can be immense, the corporate world needs to address this issue. The recent global financial crisis has further revealed the shortcomings of existing regulation. This article advances the legal debate about corporate corruption by approaching it from a corporate governance and company law perspective. Focusing on a New Zealand context, it is ultimately demonstrated that the corporate structure itself as well as the existence of poor corporate governance practices may contribute to the susceptibility of corporations to corrupt behaviour. Evaluating legal countermeasures, we arrive at the conclusion that initial steps have yielded a positive effect. However, these efforts need to be continued and advanced in order to significantly curtail opportunities for corrupt activities in corporations.

Keywords: corporate governance, corruption, fraud, directors

Suggested Citation

Watson, Susan Mary and Hirsch, Rebecca, The Link between Corporate Governance and Corruption in New Zealand (October 21, 2010). New Zealand Universities Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 42, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1695798

Susan Mary Watson (Contact Author)

University of Auckland Faculty of Law ( email )

Private Bag 92019
Auckland Mail Centre
Auckland, 1142
New Zealand

Rebecca Hirsch

University of Auckland - Department of Commercial Law ( email )

United States

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