Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax Competition

WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-11

10 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2010

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 22, 2010

Abstract

This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening.

Keywords: Costly search, tax competition, corporate taxation, monopoly pricing paradox

JEL Classification: H70, H87

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax Competition (October 22, 2010). WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1695935 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1695935

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
73
Abstract Views
2,659
Rank
314,280
PlumX Metrics