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Individuals as Enforcers: The Design of Employee Reporting Systems

in EXPLAINING REGULATORY COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO LEGAL, VOLUNTARY AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 263 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen eds., Elgar Press, 2012)

Bar Ilan University Public Law Working Paper No. 15-10

31 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2010 Last revised: 11 Oct 2014

Yuval Feldman

Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law

Orly Lobel

University of San Diego School of Law

Date Written: October 23, 2010

Abstract

This chapter presents a unique perspective on whistleblowing, combining behavioral and organizational perspectives of employee motivation to engage in social enforcement. The chapter is based on a series of experimental studies conducted by the collaborators. In our studies, we analyze the interactions among several types of factors. First, we describe cultural differences and the ways a country’s attitude and history affect decisions to blow the whistle. Second, we systemically show complex motivations in the decision to report misconduct, including both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Third, our experiments provide unique insights about the design of the law and the various incentives it can offer to support social enforcement. The studies improve our understanding of the costs and benefits of different regulatory systems and the inadvertent counterproductive effects of certain legal incentives. Based on these studies, the chapter explores the comparative advantages of various incentive structures and aim for a better fit between regulatory design and organizational and individual motivation, not only in compliance as many of the other chapters in this volume suggest but also in reporting the incompliance of others.

Suggested Citation

Feldman, Yuval and Lobel, Orly, Individuals as Enforcers: The Design of Employee Reporting Systems (October 23, 2010). in EXPLAINING REGULATORY COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO LEGAL, VOLUNTARY AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 263 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen eds., Elgar Press, 2012); Bar Ilan University Public Law Working Paper No. 15-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1696686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1696686

Yuval Feldman (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Faculty of Law
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

Orly Lobel

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States

HOME PAGE: http://home.sandiego.edu/%7Elobel/

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