Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-09

20 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2010

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Benny Geys

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

Date Written: October 25, 2010

Abstract

Countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the rules that describe the allocation of tasks, rights and duties across the various levels of government. In this paper, we present a short and selective survey of the development of the theory of optimal allocation of rights and duties along the vertical dimension in federations. We thereby first discuss the multiple trade-offs brought forward in the literature; these make that an ideal allocation of actual tasks across levels of government may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain. Then we turn to the consequences of a sub-optimal allocation of tasks and discuss spillover effects, strategic interactions between jurisdictions and intergovernmental competition. Throughout the review, we highlight paths in need of further research such that, in time, we will have a more solid ground for policy advice.

Keywords: Föderalismus, multi-level governance, decentralisation, intergovernmental relations

JEL Classification: H70, H11, H23

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Geys, Benny, Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance (October 25, 2010). WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1697454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697454

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Benny Geys

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) ( email )

Pleinlaan 2
http://www.vub.ac.be/
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
130
Abstract Views
2,986
rank
237,073
PlumX Metrics