Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance

29 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2010

See all articles by Brian L. Connelly

Brian L. Connelly

Auburn University

Robert E. Hoskisson

Arizona State University (ASU) - Management Department

Laszlo Tihanyi

Texas A&M University - Department of Management

S. Trevis Certo

Arizona State University (ASU)

Abstract

Firm ownership is an increasingly influential form of corporate governance. Although firms might be owned by different types of owners, most studies examine owner influence on a particular firm outcome in isolation. This study synthesizes research from multiple disciplines on different types of owners and offers a unifying framework of governance through ownership. Using this framework, we describe the motivations of various types of owners, the tactics owners use to affect firms in which they are invested, and the dominant firm outcomes these owners seek to influence. We note how heightened managerial awareness of heterogeneous owner interests increases owner influence on firm-level outcomes. We also provide a roadmap for future study and offer research questions about where scholars might turn their attention to better understand the role of owners in directing firm actions. Our study draws attention to emerging forms of ownership, such as hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, and highlights the changing (and often competing) interests of shareholders and how this impacts theories of governance.

Suggested Citation

Connelly, Brian L. and Hoskisson, Robert E. and Tihanyi, Laszlo and Certo, S. Trevis, Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 47, Issue 8, pp. 1561-1589, December 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698368 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00929.x

Brian L. Connelly (Contact Author)

Auburn University ( email )

Auburn, AL 36849
United States
344-844-6515 (Phone)

Robert E. Hoskisson

Arizona State University (ASU) - Management Department ( email )

Main Campus
PO Box 874006
Tempe, AZ 85287-4006
United States

Laszlo Tihanyi

Texas A&M University - Department of Management ( email )

430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States

S. Trevis Certo

Arizona State University (ASU) ( email )

Farmer Building 440G PO Box 872011
Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
8
Abstract Views
1,329
PlumX Metrics