Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

36 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2010

See all articles by Andrea Kollmann

Andrea Kollmann

Energieinstitut an der Johannes Kepler Universität Linz

Friedrich Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: October 27, 2010

Abstract

There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy yet. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation in the past decade the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy instead of command-and-control measures are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insights into how to overcome them.

Keywords: public choice and environmental policies, sustainability, voters, government, interest groups, tradeable permits, green taxes

JEL Classification: D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58

Suggested Citation

Kollmann, Andrea and Schneider, Friedrich G., Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis (October 27, 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3223, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698642

Andrea Kollmann

Energieinstitut an der Johannes Kepler Universität Linz ( email )

Altenberger Straße 69
Linz, A-4040
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://www.energieinstitut-linz.at

Friedrich G. Schneider (Contact Author)

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics ( email )

Altenbergerstrasse 69
A-4040 Linz, 4040
Austria
+43 732 2468 8210 (Phone)
+43 732 2468 8208 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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