Elections, Neutrality Agreements, and Card Checks: The Failure of the Political Model of Industrial Democracy

17 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2010 Last revised: 15 Feb 2012

James Moore

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Richard A. Bales

Ohio Northern University - Pettit College of Law

Date Written: October 27, 2010

Abstract

The secret-ballot election is the National Labor Relations Board’s preferred method for employees to determine whether they wish to be represented by a union. Employer domination of the election process, however, has led many unions to opt out of elections and instead to demand recognition based on authorization cards signed by a majority of employees. The primary objection to this “card check” process is that it is less democratic than the secret-ballot election. This article places the issue in the context of the theoretical basis for claims of industrial democracy and argues that card checks are more consistent with the basic premises of industrial democracy than are extant Board elections.

Keywords: NLRA, election, card-check, card, check, secret, ballot, union

Suggested Citation

Moore, James and Bales, Richard A., Elections, Neutrality Agreements, and Card Checks: The Failure of the Political Model of Industrial Democracy (October 27, 2010). Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 87, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698701

James Moore

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Richard A. Bales (Contact Author)

Ohio Northern University - Pettit College of Law ( email )

525 South Main Street
Ada, OH 45810
United States
419-772-2205 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.onu.edu/node/3073

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