Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force to Top Priority

49 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2010

Date Written: October 28, 2010


Inadequate law enforcement against corporate criminals appears to have created perverse incentives leading to an economic crisis — this time in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis. Prioritizing Justice proposes institutional reform at the Department of Justice (DOJ) in pursuing corporate crime. Presently, corporate crime is pursued nationally primarily through the DOJ Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and other task forces, the DOJ Criminal Division Fraud Section, and the individual U.S. Attorneys' Offices. Rather than a collection of ad hoc task forces that seek to coordinate policy among a vast array of offices and agencies, a Corporate Crimes Division should be created as a permanent base in the DOJ to combat the relentless waves of corporate criminality. The Corporate Crimes Division would more efficiently investigate and prosecute crimes of national and multinational corporations spanning multiple districts, and pursue a coordinated national policy that affirms the commitment of the DOJ to fight large-scale corporate crime which costs taxpayers billions of dollars, frustrates financial markets, increases the cost of capital to honest businesses, and undermines citizens' confidence in the rule of law. Given the cost of corporate crime, creating the division would promote superior institutional design that should yield substantial benefit.

Keywords: corporate crime, crime fighting, multinational corporation, crime, corporate growth

Suggested Citation

Ramirez, Mary Kreiner, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force to Top Priority (October 28, 2010). Marquette Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, 2010, Available at SSRN:

Mary Kreiner Ramirez (Contact Author)

Washburn University - School of Law ( email )

1700 College Avenue
Topeka, KS 66621
United States

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