Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision

Chapter in RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN TIMES OF CRISIS, G.Ferrarini, K.J.Hopt and E.Wymeersch, eds., Forthcoming

University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 29/2011

Posted: 1 Nov 2010 Last revised: 27 Mar 2012

See all articles by Eilis Ferran

Eilis Ferran

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 1, 2010

Abstract

Most of the big decisions about the rules governing financial market activity in Europe are now taken at the EU level. This has not been matched by a simultaneous centralisation of supervisory responsibility. Yet, notwithstanding that frontline supervision remains mostly a Member State responsibility, with a layer of EU-wide structural co-ordination added on top, the longstanding process of step-by-step assumption of supervisory functions by bodies that have a pan-European remit has undoubtedly accelerated in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This article examines the recent EU institutional developments with respect to financial market supervision against the background of arrangements at Member State level, and assesses their significance. It contends that whilst the recent EU institutional reforms are at the boundaries of current legal, political and practical feasibility, they include some key breakthroughs that bring the prospect of the European scene becoming dominated by euro-authorities with direct supervisory power across significant swathes of financial market activity considerably closer.

Keywords: Financial Market Supervision, Institutional Structure, Financial Crisis, Reform, European Union

JEL Classification: G01, G15, G18, G24, G28, G29, H12, K23

Suggested Citation

Ferran, Eilis, Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision (November 1, 2010). Chapter in RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN TIMES OF CRISIS, G.Ferrarini, K.J.Hopt and E.Wymeersch, eds., Forthcoming, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 29/2011 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1701147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1701147

Eilis Ferran (Contact Author)

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