Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World
Review of Financial Studies, July 13, 2015, Volume 28, Issue 8
59 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2010 Last revised: 18 Nov 2015
There are 2 versions of this paper
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World
Date Written: January 9, 2015
Abstract
Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast as shareholder voting is both mandatory and binding for important elections. For votes cast, we find there is greater dissent voting when investors fear expropriation. Further, greater dissent voting is associated with higher director turnover and more M&A withdrawals. Our results suggest that shareholder voting is an effective mechanism for exercising governance around the world.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Voting, Insider Control, Shareholder Protection, Institutional Investors
JEL Classification: D7, F30, G15, G32, G34, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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