Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

A Small Nation Goes to War: Israel's Cabinet Authorization of the 1956 War

Israel Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 61-86, Fall 2010

Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 10-37

27 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2010  

Pnina Lahav

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: November 4, 2010

Abstract

The Suez War had long term ramifications for Israel's status in the Middle East and for its relations with the U.S., Europe, and the USSR. This article is a first segment in the examination of the interplay between military and diplomatic means deployed by Israel in its quest to consolidate the gains of the 1948 war and secure its sovereignty. It provides a detailed analysis of the Israeli cabinet deliberations as it reached the decision to authorize war. The article examines the cabinet's opinions on the language of the motion to go to war, the list of casus belli offered, the secret agreement with France and Britain which precipitated the war, considerations of possible complications, the theory of war and peace, the likelihood of regime change in Egypt, and the preparedness of the home front. It raises the question of the relevance of the comparative size and strength of a nation as it ponders the option of launching a war.

Keywords: Israel, Israel's Foreign Policy, National Security, War, Foreign Affairs, Decision to Authorize War, Law and Culture

JEL Classification: K33, K39

Suggested Citation

Lahav, Pnina, A Small Nation Goes to War: Israel's Cabinet Authorization of the 1956 War (November 4, 2010). Israel Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 61-86, Fall 2010; Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 10-37. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1702886

Pnina Lahav (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-2820 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
65
Rank
293,561
Abstract Views
543