Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance

FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG AM 24 AUGUST 2010 (Festschrift for Klaus J. Hopt for his 70th birthday on 24. August 2010), August 2010, pp. 795-815, S. Grundmann, B. Haar & H. Merkt et al, eds., De Gruyter, 2010

Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 10/120

Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 10-43

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-33

ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 168/2010

29 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2010 Last revised: 30 Nov 2010

Jennifer G. Hill

The University of Sydney Law School ; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 7, 2010

Abstract

The regulation of hostile takeovers constitutes an interesting corporate governance microcosm. It is an area where clear contrasts in approach, regarding the balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors, are evident across different jurisdictions. Takeovers also reflect the dynamic operation of legal regulation (which includes the strategic responses of regulated parties themselves), and the growing tension between globalization and protectionism.

This paper analyses the regulation of hostile takeovers across a number of Western and Asian jurisdictions. First, the paper discusses the rise of takeovers and takeover defences in the United States. Against this backdrop, it examines recent developments in some other common law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Australia. It also raises the experience of the European Takeover Bid Directive, which Professor Hopt has described as “sobering”, in view of the large number of members states adopting a protectionist stance towards the directive’s implementation.

The theme of protectionism in takeovers is continued in discussion of takeovers and takeover defences in relation to two major Asian economies, Japan and China. As the paper shows, in spite of the apparent promise of open capital markets offered by globalization, protectionism is on the rise internationally and takeovers play a central role in this evolving story.

Keywords: hostile takeovers, takeover defences, poison pills, corporate governance, shareholders, directors, United States, United Kingdom, EU, Australia, Japan, China

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, G38, K22, K33

Suggested Citation

Hill, Jennifer G., Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance (November 7, 2010). FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG AM 24 AUGUST 2010 (Festschrift for Klaus J. Hopt for his 70th birthday on 24. August 2010), August 2010, pp. 795-815, S. Grundmann, B. Haar & H. Merkt et al, eds., De Gruyter, 2010; Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 10/120; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 10-43; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-33; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 168/2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1704745

Jennifer G. Hill (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney Law School ( email )

New Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
+61 2 9351 0280 (Phone)
+61 2 9351 0200 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,729
Rank
7,147
Abstract Views
8,182