Prohibitions on Health Insurance Underwriting: A Means of Making Health Insurance Available or a Cause of Market Failure?
35 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 1999
Date Written: June 18, 1999
Abstract
Health insurance underwriting restrictions that prohibit insurers from using disability status, gender, and age to classify risks will in theory result in greater insurance consumption by those positively impacted by the prohibition: disabled individuals, females, and older adults. Conversely, the prohibitions are expected to result in less health insurance consumption by those negatively impacted: able bodied individuals, males, and younger adults. Multinomial logit analysis and data from the Current Population Survey are used to test these hypotheses in both the small group and individual markets for health insurance. We find evidence consistent with theory.
JEL Classification: D1, D8, I1, J3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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