Theories of Harm in the Intel Case

41 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2010  

Patrick DeGraba

Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I

John David Simpson

The Brattle Group

Date Written: November 8, 2010

Abstract

Over the past several years, government competition agencies and private plaintiffs have sued Intel challenging the legality of its relationships with original equipment computer manufacturers (“OEMs”). These lawsuits have combined to produce a detailed account describing Intel’s relationships with OEMs and analyzing the competitive effects of these relationships. This paper uses the public evidence in this account as a starting point for further analysis of both competition in downstream markets and the structure of Intel’s contracts with OEMs. By presenting this additional analysis, this paper seeks to better identify the circumstances under which exclusive contracts can lead to anticompetitive harm.

Keywords: exclusive contracts

JEL Classification: K21, L12

Suggested Citation

DeGraba, Patrick and Simpson, John David, Theories of Harm in the Intel Case (November 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1705753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1705753

Patrick DeGraba

Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Rm. 4249
Washington, DC 20580
United States
202-326-2855 (Phone)
202-326-3443 (Fax)

John David Simpson (Contact Author)

The Brattle Group ( email )

1850 M Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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