Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game

28 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2010

See all articles by Leonardo Boncinelli

Leonardo Boncinelli

University of Siena - Dipartimento di Economia Politica

Paolo Pin

Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena

Date Written: July 12, 2010

Abstract

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the maximal number of players contributes.

Keywords: Networks, Best Shot Game, Stochastic Stability

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D85, H41

Suggested Citation

Boncinelli, Leonardo and Pin, Paolo, Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game (July 12, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 124.2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1707518 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1707518

Leonardo Boncinelli

University of Siena - Dipartimento di Economia Politica ( email )

Piazza San Francesco 8
Siena, I53100
Italy

Paolo Pin (Contact Author)

Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena ( email )

Piazza San Francesco 8
Siena, I53100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/paolopin/

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