Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment

44 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2010 Last revised: 24 Jun 2011

See all articles by Volker Laux

Volker Laux

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 23, 2011

Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal design of stock option vesting conditions when the CEO faces a risk of being replaced at an interim date. First, I show that long vesting terms do not necessarily discourage but in fact can encourage short-termism. Second, the model demonstrates that the optimal vesting schedule involves balancing incentives for managerial effort with incentives for long-term investment. Due to this trade-off, overinvestment in myopic projects can arise from optimal contracting and is not necessarily an artifact of faulty pay arrangements. The study generates new empirical predictions regarding the determinants and impacts of stock option vesting terms in contract design.

Keywords: Executive Pay, Stock Option Vesting Conditions, Myopic Investment, CEO Turnover

Suggested Citation

Laux, Volker, Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment (June 23, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1707539 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1707539

Volker Laux (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )

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Austin, TX 78712
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