Capital Allocation Effects of Financial Reporting Regulation and Enforcement

Posted: 14 Nov 2010 Last revised: 14 Nov 2012

Date Written: November 12, 2010

Abstract

This paper analyses the effects of stricter financial reporting enforcement on capital allocation and reporting quality in a game-theoretic model and derives conclusions about optimal enforcement strictness. Analysis of the model shows that reporting quality strictly increases with tighter enforcement. However, the effect of stricter enforcement on capital allocation is non-monotonic. Intermediate enforcement strictness results in overdeterrence of viable projects even without costs of compliance. This effect can be alleviated by means of either less or more stringent enforcement.

Keywords: accounting regulation, enforcement, earnings management, earnings quality, capital allocation, analytical accounting

Suggested Citation

Koenigsgruber, Roland, Capital Allocation Effects of Financial Reporting Regulation and Enforcement (November 12, 2010). European Accounting Review, Volume 21, Issue 2 (2012), 283-296. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1708223

Roland Koenigsgruber (Contact Author)

SKEMA Business School ( email )

Lille
France

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