Keeping a Big Promise: Options for Baselines to Assess 'New and Additional' Climate Finance

Center for Comparative and International Studies Working Paper No. 66

27 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2010

See all articles by Martin Stadelmann

Martin Stadelmann

University of Zurich

Axel Michaelowa

University of Zurich - Institute of Political Science; University of Zurich - Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS)

J. Timmons Roberts

Brown University

Date Written: November 18, 2010

Abstract

All major climate policy agreements - the UN Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and recently the Copenhagen Accord - have stated that climate finance for developing countries will be "new and additional". However, the term "new and additional" has never been properly defined. Agreeing a system to measure a baseline from which "new and additional" funding will be calculated will be central to building trust and realising any post-Kyoto agreement. We explore eight different options for a baseline, and assess each according to several criteria: novelty to existing pledges, additionality to development assistance, environmental effectiveness, distributional consequences, and institutional and political feasibility. Only two baseline options do well on these criteria and are therefore viable: "new funds only" and "above pre-defined business as usual level of development assistance". The final section assesses the impact of the baseline definition on the novelty and additionality of "fast start finance" pledged under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, showing that values can vary from 0 to 100% depending on the definition.

Keywords: Climate Finance, Copenhagen Accord, Development Assistance, Additionality, UNFCCC

Suggested Citation

Stadelmann, Martin and Michaelowa, Axel and Roberts, J. Timmons, Keeping a Big Promise: Options for Baselines to Assess 'New and Additional' Climate Finance (November 18, 2010). Center for Comparative and International Studies Working Paper No. 66. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1711158 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1711158

Martin Stadelmann (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Axel Michaelowa

University of Zurich - Institute of Political Science ( email )

Dep. of International Relations
Seilergraben 49
CH-8001 Zurich
Switzerland
+41 433550073 (Phone)
+41 448204206 (Fax)

University of Zurich - Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) ( email )

Affolternstrasse 56
8050 Zurich
Switzerland
+41 433550073 (Phone)
+41 448204206 (Fax)

J. Timmons Roberts

Brown University ( email )

Box 1860
Providence, RI 02912
United States

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