Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10.31

23 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2010

See all articles by Amihai Glazer

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Stef Proost

KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 1, 2010

Abstract

A winning coalition which sets policy cannot always ensure that members of the coalition will be the ones getting benefits. Different jurisdictions (including members of the winning coalition) may then engage in costly rent seeking. Maximizing the welfare of the winning coalition may therefore require providing services to jurisdictions which are not members of the winning coalition, thereby reducing rent seeking by members of the winning coalition. The paper shows how this mechanism can generate insufficient supply of public services, and offers another explanation for the use of co-funding requirements by the central government

Suggested Citation

Glazer, Amihai and Proost, Stef V., Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service (November 1, 2010). Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10.31. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1711713 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1711713

Amihai Glazer (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-854-6563 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

Stef V. Proost

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
016 32 66 35 (Phone)
016 32 67 96 (Fax)

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