An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games

12 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2010

Date Written: November 19, 2010

Abstract

Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoff-irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game can differ across types, aggregate play in any such equilibrium must coincide with a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the complete information game. This justifies the interpretation of certain data, including many laboratory experiments, as arising from a symmetric equilibrium, even when asymmetric equilibria exist and, in addition, subjects may be heterogeneous.

Keywords: Symmetry, Bayesian Game, Laboratory Experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C90

Suggested Citation

Kuzmics, Christoph and Rogers, Brian W., An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games (November 19, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1712102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1712102

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

Brian W. Rogers

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www20.kellogg.northwestern.edu/facdir/facpage.asp?sid=10018

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